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I. INTRODUCTION
The recently operational' trading link between the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange ("CME") and the Singapore International Monetary Ex-
change ("SIMEX") 2 is one of the most significant developments to occur
in the securities industry in recent memory. While the initial phase of
this intermarket, intercontinental link involves only the trading of
Eurodollar, Deutsche mark, and Japanese yen futures contracts,3 the
prospects for the trading of additional contracts,4 and the further expan-
sion of trading hours, ultimately to round-the-clock trading, appear
favorable.
The internationalization of both foreign and domestic futures mar-
kets is clearly the order of the day.' A trading link connecting the fu-
tures exchanges of two separate nations, however, represents a new and
truly experimental phenomenon, one which has prompted concern
1 Trading over the CME-SIMEX link commenced on Friday, September 7, 1984. See, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 7, 1984, at Dl, col. 3; Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
2 Formerly the Gold Exchange of Singapore, the SIMEX was created in response to the desire
of the Monetary Authority of Singapore to enter into the trading of financial futures. Three officials
of the CME were invited to consult with Singapore Monetary Authority officials as to how the
desired expansion of SIMEX into a full-scale financial futures marketplace might be accomplished.
While originally intended to spur the growth and development of the SIMEX, the consultations
between CME and SIMEX officials led instead to a feasibility study of a trading link joining the
trading floors of the CME and the newly constituted SIMEX. Thus, the potential for expansion of
the CME's market activities came into being as well.
3 The decision to commence trading with only three contracts was based upon research which
demonstrated the significant average change in the dollar value of one Eurodollar or Japanese yen
futures contract during non-United States trading hours. See infra note 14.
4 The CME has petitioned the Commodity Futures Trading Commission for permission to be-
gin trading a gold futures contract identical to that which has been trading on SIMEX since July 5,
1984. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Market Perspectives (Sept. 1984) (the monthly bulletin of the
exchange).
5 As a result of rapid advances in communications technology, traders worldwide currently
enjoy almost instantaneous access to the price quotations and trading floors of futures markets any-
where in the world. See, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 169 (1984).
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among regulators and members of the investment community inasmuch
as the once abstract regulatory and jurisdictional issues raised by an in-
ternational trading link have now presented themselves as realities for
the first time.
Utilization of the CME-SIMEX link creates substantial opportuni-
ties both for the commercial hedger as well as the individual or institu-
tional speculator by expanding trading flexibility and lowering
transaction costs.6 Increased opportunity, however, is likely to spawn
difficulty in situations where, for instance, a SIMEX trader in Singapore
using the trading link alleges some act of fraud or misrepresentation pro-
hibited under United States laws and then seeks to employ the federal
judicial forum in an effort to recover damages or such other remedies as
are authorized by statute.
The issue of at what point fraudulently induced market activity ini-
tiated abroad becomes justiciable in this country has received considera-
ble attention in the field of securities law.7 Growth and interest in the
trading of commodity and financial futures contracts have resulted more
recently in an examination of the extraterritorial application of the anti-
fraud provisions of the Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA"). 8 Predict-
ably, United States courts have thus far analogized from the existing
body of securities law to the futures field in order to afford traders claim-
ing to have been defrauded abroad the protections and remedies available
under our laws for violations of the Commodities Exchange Act.9
Part I of this Comment will fully explore the novel concept embod-
ied by the CME-SIMEX trading link. Next, Part II will analyze the
most recent judicial decision-one not involving the trading link-con-
cerning the extraterritorial application of federal commodities statutes to
illegal acts alleged to have been committed abroad. And finally, in Part
III, this Comment will examine the arguments in favor of and against
extraterritorial application of the Securities and Commodities Exchange
Acts to claims of predominantly foreign fraud in an era of increasing
internationalization of world financial markets. The conclusion reached
is that existing judicial doctrines used in dealing with the determination
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, while fashioned over a decade ago, are
now, more than ever, appropriately applied to protect domestic interests
6 Illustrations of increased trading flexibility and evidence of lowered transaction costs are
presented infra at notes 15 and 18 respectively.
7 See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
8 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1982).
9 See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
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from the effects of fraudulent conduct exported, in any degree, to the
United States.
The analysis set forth herein is equally applicable to other trading
links which have either been undertaken or are rumored to be under con-
sideration between foreign and domestic exchanges ° or as other ex-
changes are added to the CME-SIMEX link in furtherance of the
concept of round-the-clock futures trading.
II. THE TRADING LINK
A. The Concept
Commodity and financial futures contracts are among the most vol-
atile of investment vehicles1 1 as their market prices are determined on the
basis of any number of international events which can occur at any hour.
Natural disasters in one corner of the world quite frequently will affect
the price of such "soft" commodities as wheat, cocoa, or sugar through-
out the rest of the world. 2 Similarly, political and economic uncertain-
ties the world over are often responsible for a strengthening or weakening
in the value of world currencies.13 Whether or not futures markets in
10 At this writing, other links presently operational in the securities field include links between
the Boston and Montreal Stock Exchanges, the Toronto and American Stock Exchanges and the
London Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") in the
Over the Counter Market. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1986, at Dl, col. 3. Links currently being
contemplated but not yet operational include a possible link between the Chicago Board of Trade
and the London International Financial Futures Exchange, see FUTURas, Sept. 1984, at 55; a link
between the American Stock Exchange Options Exchange and the European Options Exchange and
a joinder between the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange is also pro-
posed. Conversation with William Brodsky, President, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Apr. 30,
1986).
While more and more of such links are contemplated and become operational, only the link
between SIMEX and the CME offers futures traders substantial opportunities in the areas of limita-
tion of oversight trading risk and a lengthening of the actual trading day.
11 Of course, it is not the futures contract itself which results in the instrument's extraordinary
volatility but rather the value of the commodity or currency underlying the contract. Because many
underlying commodities and currencies represent foodstuffs, raw materials, fuels and means of ex-
change, futures contracts tend to be extremely volatile due to the sensitivity of the financial commu-
nity to the slightest shifts in crop or production forecasts and currency stabilities.
12 The citrus cancre outbreak in Florida in 1984, which resulted in dramatic increases in orange
futures contract prices, is an example of a natural phenomenon which had an enormous impact upon
"soft" commodity prices.
13 Mexico's recent economic crisis provides a useful illustration. Mexico sought to take full
advantage of what seemed to be an insatiable worldwide demand for oil during the 1970s. Unfortu-
nately, the world's industrial nations soon found themselves trapped in a recession and Mexico, in
turn, found itself with a foreign debt in excess of $48 billion which it had assumed in expectation of
continued worldwide demand for oil. President de la Madrid's bold economic austerity program
drastically devalued the peso, a measure which shook world currency markets. For a more detailed
account of Mexico's troubles, see TIME, June 13, 1983, at 48.
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any given part of the world will be open when such events take place is
purely a matter of chance.
The CME-SIMEX link was instituted in response to the vicissitudes
of the world economy and the resultant risk an investor in futures con-
tracts used to have to bear during the sixteen hours futures exchanges
were closed each day. 4 The three futures contracts initially involved in
the CME-SIMEX link (Eurodollars, Deutsche marks, and Japanese yen)
are currently traded on the CME from 7:30 am (CST) until roughly 2:00
pm (CST). With the trading of these contracts on SIMEX, additional
trading hours from roughly 6:30 pm (CST) to 1:00 am (CST) have be-
come effective.15 Thus, the CME-SIMEX trading link allows for almost
a doubling in the length of the trading day and a concomitant decrease in
the degree of overnight risk traders are forced to bear between an ex-
change's closing and its opening the following morning.
B. The Mutual Offset System
The real benefit to be gained as the result of the extended trading
hours made possible by the CME-SIMEX link derives from what has
been termed the Mutual Offset System ("MOS"). 16 Until recently, if a
trader took a position in ninety-day Eurodollar futures in Chicago during
the day and then, after the CME had concluded its trading day, interna-
tional events suddenly required the liquidation of that Eurodollar posi-
14 A study conducted jointly by Data Resources, Inc. and the CME during the period December
10, 1982 to August 1, 1983 demonstrates the significance of the average change in the dollar value of
Japanese yen and Eurodollar futures contracts during hours when United States futures markets are
closed. The study further illustrates the average change in the dollar value of yen and Eurodollar
contracts during the United States trading day and the total average change in dollar value over a
24-hour period.
15 A comparison of Chicago trading hours (cst) with Singapore trading hours displaying actual
Singapore time and equivalent Chicago (cst) time is illustrated below:
Commodity CME Trading SIMEX Trading Hrs. Corresponding
Hours (cst) Singapore Time (cst)
DM 7:30am-1:20pm 8:35am-2:50pm 6:35pm-12:50am
Eurodollar 7:30am-2:00pm 9:00am-3:00pm 7:00pm- 1:00am
Y 7:30am-l:22pm 8:30am-2:45pm 6:30pm-12:45am
The seemingly random close of trading for the mark and yen can be explained by the fact that
for operational reasons, the CME has chosen to stagger the closings of its currency futures at two-
minute intervals. Not only do staggered closings allow for a more orderly conclusion of trading but
traders who trade more than one financial futures contract are afforded an opportunity to be present
at the close of each currency traded.
16 The Mutual Offset System is defined as, "the system established pursuant to this Agreement
whereby certain Clearing Members of either Exchange may liquidate or establish positions on one
Exchange through the execution of trades on the other Exchange." The Agreement for the Creation
of a Mutual Offset System Between the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Singapore Interna-
tional Monetary Exchange, Ltd. (June 28, 1984) [hereinafter the Agreement]. A copy of the Agree-
ment is available at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago, Illinois.
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tion, in order to limit losses a trader would have to sell (go short) a
corresponding number of Eurodollar contracts on another futures ex-
change open for trading during what would be evening hours in the
United States.1 7 The following day, in order to close out the two separate
market positions, the trader would have to sell out the long position in
Chicago and cover the short sale on the foreign exchange.
The MOS substantially reduces the chances that four transactions
will have to be executed in the event that exigent market circumstances
or investor decisions necessitate trading at hours during which a trader's
original marketplace is closed. Assuming that SIMEX is open when the
Chicago trader needs to liquidate a market position opened on the CME,
the MOS will permit a position (purchase or short sale) to be offset by a
corresponding, but opposite, transaction on SIMEX. Trades initiated on
SIMEX can likewise be offset by transactions on the CME. Not only is
the number of orders a trader has to place cut in half, resulting over time
in considerable commissions savings,18 but the trader is required to pay
only one bid-ask spread19 rather than the two such spreads required
when closing out a market position on an exchange different from where
the position originated. Along these same lines, the CME-SIMEX link is
characterized by a single margin structure,20 thus eliminating the need
17 This predicament should not be confused with a similar situation, in fact a strategy which a
trader may choose to adopt, called "spreading." Spreading is defined as "It]he purchase of one
futures contract and the sale of another, in the expectation that the price relationships between the
two will change so that a subsequent offsetting sale and purchase will yield an amount as profit." See
Chicago Board of Trade, Commodity Trading Manual 283 (1933).
18 While commissions are no longer fixed but are instead negotiable, brokerage houses still pub-
lish commission schedules which act as a point of departure for individual brokers wishing to pro-
vide customers with some sort of discount. For example, Paine Webber's basic commission rate
table for future trading provides for a $90 commission on the purchase or sale of one Eurodollar
futures contract, a $900 commission on the purchase or sale of 10 Eurodollar contracts and a $2250
commission for the purchase or sale of 25 Eurodollar contracts. These rates may be discounted up
to 50% depending upon the agreement struck between broker and client. Quoted by Paine Webber,
Inc. (Nov. 1, 1984) (all trades based upon CME execution). Where traders are forced to cover
market positions on other exchanges these transaction costs will be at least doubled due to increased
commissions where executions take place on a foreign market.
19 The "bid-ask" spread is the difference between the price a trader is prepared to bid (pay) for a
particular futures contract and the price other traders are asking in exchange for those same con-
tracts. In a strong market, buyers will often raise their bids to meet sellers' asking prices and, con-
versely, in a weak market sellers will often lower their asking prices in order to meet buyers' bids.
20 Futures trading normally involves greater sums of money than ordinary securities transac-
tions due to the sizable contract specifications involved-i.e. one Japanese yen contract represents
12.5 million yen. As a result of the dollar amounts at stake as well as the potential for considerable
volatility, trading accounts are settled each day with accounts credited or debited at the conclusion
of daily trading to reflect the current market value of a trader's position. A margin account is an
account which a trader is required to maintain in order to absorb debits made at the end of a trading
session or to accumulate credits as market conditions on any given day may dictate.
Heretofore a trader would have had to maintain at least two separate margin accounts (tying up
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for a trader to maintain more than one margin account21 in anticipation
of having to offset a market position on a second market.
C. Inter-Exchange Transfers
The operational functioning of the MOS is considerably more diffi-
cult to comprehend than is the conceptual functioning of the system.
For example, offsetting a position assumed on the CME by an opposite
transaction executed on SIMEX is made possible by the result of "inter-
exchange transfers."22 The parties involved in these inter-exchange
transfers are referred to as "originating clearing members"23 and "exe-
cuting clearing members."' 4 An originating clearing member is a mem-
ber of one of the linked exchanges which initiates orders for execution on
the other linked exchange on which the originating firm is not a clearing
member, i.e., a CME member firm for purposes of trades to be executed
on SIMEX. Conversely, an executing clearing member is an exchange
twice as much cash) in order to preserve the flexibility to liquidate a position on a second market if
such a transaction became necessary. As has been stated, a trader employing the CME-SIMEX link
can enjoy trading flexibility while maintaining only one margin account.
Currency U.S. Overnight Risk U.S. Trading Risk Total Risk
Eurodollar $225 $350 $400
Y $212 $188 $288
Although United States overnight risk is not as great as United States trading day risk in the
case of Eurodollars, exposure remains considerable-Eurodollar overnight risk is 9 basis points or
64% of the 14 basis point daytime risk. Overnight risk is actually greater in the case of the Japanese
yen futures contract than is the case during the United States trading day because events likely to
affect the value of the yen most often occur during Japan's business day which coincides with eve-
ning hours in the United States. United States overnight risk for the yen trader is (in United States
financial market terms) 17 basis points or 113% of the 15 basis point risk during United States
daytime trading hours. See Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Market Perspectives 1 (Sept. 1983).
The study included comparable data for SIMEX's one ounce gold futures contract but CME
and SIMEX officials decided, at least initially, to substitute the trading of a Deutsche mark contract
for the gold contract based upon the former's generally recognized status as the primary commercial
currency of Europe and the latter's recent sluggish market performance. Interview with William
Brodsky, President of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Oct. 28, 1984).
21 As opposed to the generic meaning of a margin account when applied to securities trading, a
margin account in the case of futures trading is "the amount deposited as a guarantee for the fluctua-
tions of a futures purchase or sale. If the contract fluctuates against the holder of the contract, he is
required to provide for the difference between his contract price and the current market price by
paying 'variation margin' differences. Thus, the original margin continues to guarantee fully the
performance of the contract at any market price level." GUIDE TO WORLD COMMODrIY MARKErs
367 (E. de Keyser ed. 1979).
22 Terminology adopted by the Agreement but which may not be used by traders, the popular
press or others not strictly familiar with the trading link's contractual underpinnings. An "Inter-
Exchange Transfer" is defined in the Agreement as a "transfer pursuant to the Mutual Offset System
to one Exchange of a position established as a result of a trade executed on the other Exchange ..
See Agreement, supra note 16, at 4.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 3.
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member firm which accepts and executes orders initiated by originating
clearing members.25 Facilitated by these market participants, the inter-
exchange transfer process is comprised of two separate procedures:
"matching" 6 and "clearing."2 7
Once an executing clearing member has executed a trade received
from an originating clearing member, that trade must initially be
"matched" by the clearing house of the executing exchange. Matching
simply entails a comparison of the trading information submitted by both
sides of a trade to the clearing house. Where the trading information of
both parties to a transaction is identical, the buy and the sell orders are
deemed to have been matched.2 8 The second step in the inter-exchange
transfer is the "clearing" process. Clearing a trade is the procedure un-
dertaken at the close of trading each day in which the price at which a
given execution took place is compared with the closing price ("settle-
ment price") of that futures contract for that day.29 The amount of vari-
ation between the price at which the trade took place and the price at
which the contract closed for the day is computed and then collected by
the clearing house from one clearing member and paid to another.30
The MOS requires the complete cooperation of the participating ex-
changes and their clearing houses to facilitate the smooth operation of
inter-exchange transfers. In an effort to ensure as trouble-free a transfer
process as is possible, the agreement between the CME and SIMEX pro-
vides for an Inter-Exchange Administrator whose chief responsibility is
to preside over and to clarify the matching and clearing of inter-exchange
25 While all present clearing members of both the CME and SIMEX are potentially eligible to
place and/or execute orders over the trading link, only clearing members who are specifically au-
thorized by their parent exchange may actually facilitate their own trades over the link. In addition
to authorization by the parent exchange to participate in the transaction of business over the link,
CME firms may apply to SIMEX for membership and SIMEX firms may seek membership on the
CME to obviate the need for agreements between the authorized clearing members of different ex-
changes providing that one member will execute the orders initiated by the other and vice-versa.
According to Law and Compliance Reporter, a monthly publication of the Futures Industry Associa-
tion, as of September 1984 some 20 domestic futures commission merchants had become members of
SIMEX and over 80 CME member firms had been designated to participate as authorized clearing
members for MOS trades. See LAW & COMPLIANCE REP., Sept. 1984, at 1.
26 "Matching" is a term used industry-wide and is not peculiar to the trading link's operations or
the MOS.
27 "Clearing" is likewise a generic term.
28 For a more detailed discussion of this facet of the operational process of futures trading, see
I T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES, FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKET § 2.02 (1983);
1 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION 97-100, §§ 1.31, 1.32 (1982).
29 An order so processed is termed "marked-to-market," a process performed industry-wide.
30 For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the operations process, see T. Russo, supra
note 28, and P. JOHNSON, supra note 28.
31 See Agreement, supra note 16, at 3.
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orders immediately prior to their transfer from executing exchange to
originating exchange, the final step in the inter-market transfer process.
D. A Summary
To recapitulate the inter-exchange transfer process briefly, the pro-
cedure follows these general steps: 1) an originating clearing member
transmits a customer order to an executing clearing member for execu-
tion; 2) the executing clearing member executes the order which is then
processed by the executing exchange's clearing house; 3) the executing
exchange's clearing house matches the trade between executing floor bro-
kers; 4) the trade is then submitted to the originating exchange's clearing
house MOS to match the trade between exchanges and to settle the trade
among clearing members; and finally 5) the Inter-Exchange Administra-
tor certifies the transaction and the trade is then transferred to the books
of the originating clearing member as if the transaction had taken place
on the originating clearing member's exchange.3 2
One last, but not unimportant, advantage accruing to those employ-
ing the CME-SIMEX link is that the link makes possible the trading of
identical futures contracts on more than one exchange.33 Heretofore, the
trader who was forced to cover a market position on a second market
often assumed an added element of risk by having to offset an already
existing market position with a new contract of different specifications
resulting in some market exposure and ultimately requiring one last
transaction to extinguish the remaining position. Since the CME-
SIMEX link has made possible the trading of identical contracts in Chi-
cago and Singapore, the trading link provides both for the offset of oppo-
site market transactions undertaken on either the CME or SIMEX and,
for offset to be exact, the elimination of yet another previously unavoida-
ble element of risk with which traders were forced to deal.
32 For a more complex, if more exact, summary of the operationals procedures of the MOS, see
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Perspectives 4 (Sept. 1984), or any of the CME or SIMEX publicity
materials directly obtainable from the respective exchanges.
33 For example, while Japanese yen futures contracts have the exact same specifications on both
the CME and the New York Mercantile Exchange (12.5 million yen) and both the Chicago Board of
Trade and the Kansas City Board of Trade trade an identical wheat futures contract (5,000 bushels),
the simultaneous existence of identical futures contracts in this country is of no use to a trader
seeking to insure against overnight risk on those market positions.
At this point, with the exception of the CME-SIMEX trading link, no foreign futures exchange
involves contracts with specifications identical to those possessed by contracts traded on domestic
exchanges. The London International Financial Futures Exchange ("LIFFE") trades contracts
nearly identical to those traded on the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBT"), with whom LIFFE is soon
to be affiliated; but regardless of how closely the CBT and LIFFE contracts resemble one another,
they will not be completely fungible as are the contracts traded over the CME-SIMEX trading link.
Trading Links
7:351(1985)
An expanded trading day making possible a tremendous increase in
trading flexibility, an elimination of wasteful commissions charges, and
an ability to trade with perfect symmetry between two marketplaces sep-
arated by half a world, all account for the very real significance of this
new intermarket, intercontinental trading link.
III. CASE LAW
A. The Issues
Regardless of -the manner in which the CME-SIMEX link reduces
both overnight trading risk and market transaction costs, trading over
the link will not be problem-free. Traders employing the trading link are
certain to bring actions against brokers and brokerage houses alleging the
same violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the CEA34 as have been
increasingly invoked since the formation of the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC")3 5 and the advent of more stringent regu-
lation of the commodity futures industry.36
To the extent that fraudulent conduct is alleged by a complainant to
have been committed in this country by a commodity futures broker (for-
eign or domestic), United States courts have unhesitatingly asserted sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and proceeded under the CEA.37 In contrast, the
exercise of jurisdiction over extraterritorial CEA claims is not as simple a
matter. Federal courts have thus turned to the more developed body of
law dealing with securities fraud under the Securities Acts of 1933 and
193438 for guidance as to when United States jurisdiction should be exer-
cised over violations of the CEA alleged to have taken place abroad.3 9
The United States courts' application of the CEA to this species of extra-
territorial claim is complicated not only by an analysis of the materiality
34 The anti-fraud provisions of the CEA consist primarily of § 4 and § 6 of the Act. 7 U.S.C.
§§ 4, 6 (1982).
35 Congress established the CFTC in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974
("CFTCA"), Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
36 Public criticism of commodity markets, congressional concern over the increased use of fu-
tures markets for speculative purposes, and the widespread perception that the regulatory system
established by the CEA was wholly inadequate to meet the demands facing it, prompted the revision
in 1974 of the CEA by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act. For a history of the
events leading up to the adoption of the CFTCA and an analysis of its provisions, see Modernizing
the Regulation of the Commodity Futures Markets, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 35 (1975).
37 See infra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
38 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbbb (1982); The Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-111 (1982).
39 See, eg., Mormels v. Girofinance, S.A., 544 F. Supp. 815, 817 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Securi-
ties cases and principles are used as persuasive aids to interpretation of the CEA."); Miller v. New
York Produce Exchange, 550 F.2d 762, 769 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); CFTC v.
J.S. Love Assoc. Options, 422 F. Supp. 652, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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of the conduct alleged to have taken place within this country, but also
by more delicate issues involving United States foreign relations and the
reach of United States laws. The ability now to trade futures contracts in
Singapore with offset possible through MOS in Chicago has caused con-
cern among traders, brokers, and regulators over whether individuals
utilizing the trading link will be entitled to the same protections afforded
traders who trade exclusively on United States futures exchanges.' °
B. The Law
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon)4 is the most recent case concern-
ing the extraterritorial application of the anti-fraud provisions of the
CEA. Tamari involved a claim by citizens and residents of Lebanon,
three brothers, that defendant Bache & Co. (Bache Lebanon), a Lebanese
corporation and wholly-owned subsidiary of Bache & Co., Inc., a Dela-
ware corporation, committed acts of fraud and misrepresentation in vio-
lation of Sections 4b and 4c of the CEA4 a which resulted in losses to the
plaintiffs in excess of two million dollars. In particular, the defendant
was alleged by the Tamaris to have made misrepresentations regarding
40 See, eg., N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1984, at DI, col. 1; Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1984, at 2, col. 2; The
Link Felt 'Round the World, FUTURES, Sept. 1984, at 54-56.
41 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984).
42 Section 4(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any member of a contract market, or for any correspondent, agent or
employee of any member, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making of, any
contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, made, or to be made, on or subject to
the rules of any contract market, for or on behalf of any other person...
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report or state-
ment thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person any false record
thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means whatsoever
in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution of any such order or
contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with respect to such order or contract for
such person; or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset against the order or orders of any
other person, or willfully and knowingly and without the prior consent of such person to be-
come the buyer in respect to any selling order of such person, or become the seller in respect to
any buying order of such person.
Section 4(c) states:
(a) Meretricious transactions
It shall be unlawful for any person to offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm the execu-
tion of, any transaction involving any commodity, which is or may be used for (I) hedging any
transaction in interstate commerce in such commodity or the products or byproducts thereof, or
(2) determining the price basis of any such transaction in interstate commerce in such commod-
ity, or (3) delivering any such commodity sold, shipped, or received in interstate commerce for
the fulfillment thereof-
(A) if such transaction is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, a
"wash sale," "cross trade," or "accomodation trade," or is a fictitious sale; or
(B) if such transaction is used to cause any price to be reported, registered, or recorded
which is not a true and bona fide price.
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its expertise in the management of commodity futures accounts, to have
given false advice concerning market conditions, to have mismanaged
plaintiffs' accounts, and to have breached its fiduciary duty. a3
Bache Lebanon responded to the Tamaris' allegations by moving in
district court for a judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment in its favor. The grounds upon which Bache Leba-
non sought summary disposition of the complaint were three: lack of
subject matter jurisdiction,' collateral estoppel,45 and no right of action
under the CEA and its associated rules and regulations." The district
court disposed of Bache Lebanon's collateral estoppel and right of action
arguments without difficulty. The issue of the court's subject matter ju-
risdiction over the cause of action brought by plaintiffs was the basis of
the district court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Bache Lebanon moved unsuccessfully for the district court to recon-
sider its denial of summary judgment; however, the district court did
certify for appeal that part of its order dealing with the court's exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims presented. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit permitted an interlocutory ap-
peal to be taken on the narrow issue of federal subject matter jurisdiction,
characterizing the precise legal issue to be considered as, "[w]hether the
district court has subject matter jurisdiction under the CEA over a dis-
pute between nonresident aliens when the trading of commodity futures
contracts giving rise to the suit took place on United States exchanges
but the contacts between the parties occurred in Lebanon."'4 Ulti-
mately, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Bache
Lebanon's motion for summary judgment, holding that subject matter
jurisdiction, did, in fact, exist.
The undisputed facts giving rise to this litigation are relatively
straightforward but because the question presented concerned federal ju-
risdiction, a brief recapitulation of the events at issue, where they took
43 Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon), 547 F. Supp. 309, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
44Id.
45 Bache Lebanon asserts that the issues raised by the Tamaris were collaterally estopped by an
arbitrator's decision in favor of Bache & Co., Inc. (Delaware). The district court found, however,
that since Bache Lebanon was not a party to the arbitration it would have to show that it was
entitled to rely on the arbitration decision under principles of collateral estoppel. In the opinion of
the district court, Bache Lebanon failed to make such a showing. Id at 316.
46 The district court rejected Bache Lebanon's argument that the Tamaris had no private right
of action under § 4(b) and § 4(c) of the CEA stating, "[p]rior to the 1974 amendments to the CEA,
federal courts had routinely recognized a private cause of action under the statute, and in the recent
case of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran... the Supreme Court held that a private
cause of action survived the 1974 amendments." Id. (citation omitted).
47 730 F.2d at 1104.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:351(1985)
place, their whereabouts, and the locations of the parties involved is ap-
propriate. Plaintiffs, Lebanese citizens and residents, maintained com-
modity futures trading accounts with the defendant Lebanese
corporation. In trading for plaintiffs' accounts, Bache Lebanon would
receive orders from plaintiffs at its office in Beirut and would then trans-
mit them to Bache & Co., Inc. in the United States for execution on
either the CME or the Chicago Board of Trade. All conversations be-
tween the plaintiffs and the defendant prior to the opening of plaintiffs'
accounts and regarding what later were alleged to be fraudulently in-
duced trades resulting in plaintiffs' loss in excess of two million dollars,
took place in Lebanon. Only the execution of plaintiffs' orders occurred
in the United States.
C. The District Court
In its analysis of the facts in Tamari,48 the district court looked to
the analogous body of securities law dealing with the transnational scope
of the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934.49 Courts grappling
with the transnational application of the Securities Exchange Acts fash-
ioned two distinct but related tests in an effort to ascertain whether the
particular facts surrounding a fraudulent scheme warranted application
of United States statutes or whether such a scheme should instead be
dealt with under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the fraud had been
perpetrated. These tests, to which the district court turned initially for
guidance and which eventually formed the basis of the court's denial of
defendant's motion, are termed the "conduct test" and the "effects test."
L The Conduct Test
First fashioned by the Second Circuit in Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corporation v. Maxwell,"° the conduct test arose out of a case
brought under Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 in
which plaintiffs, United States citizens, alleged fraud surrounding their
purchase, through British brokers on the London Stock Exchange, of
48 547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
49 Id. at 311.
50 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
51 Section 10(b) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change... I
(b). To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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shares in a British corporation whose stock was not registered or traded
on United States exchanges. 2 Reversing the district court's dismissal of
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit in
Leasco upheld jurisdiction, finding that "abundant misrepresentations in
the United States ' 53 had taken place and that such domestic conduct was
sufficient to enable federal courts to apply the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to the case at bar even though the sale of securities took place on
the London Stock Exchange.5 4 The doctrinal basis of the conduct test
can be traced to section seventeen of The Restatement (Second) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States. 5 The essence of section seven-
teen of the Restatement was distilled by the court of appeals in Leasco
into a rule providing that, "the nation where the conduct has occurred
has jurisdiction to displace foreign law and to direct its courts to apply its
own."
56
Formulation of the conduct test in Leasco has resulted in attempts
by the judiciary to define more precisely what types of conduct will be
sufficient to justify the exercise of United States jurisdiction over extra-
territorial Securities Exchange Act claims. The district court in Tamari
traced the progeny of Leasco, which limited the reach of the conduct test
in the field of securities fraud, and settled upon the standard of conduct
established in another securities fraud case, Travis v. Anthes Imperial,
Ltd. :7 "significant conduct with respect to the alleged violation [of the
Securities Exchange Act] in the U.S."58 Similarly, in Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 9 the Second Circuit further narrowed its own holding in
Leasco when it stated: "We see no reason to extend it [satisfaction of the
conduct test] to cases where the U.S. activities are merely preparatory
... and are relatively small in comparison to those abroad."6 Finally, in
lIT v. Vencap,61 the Second Circuit made plain that only material con-
duct in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme would satisfy the conduct
52 468 F.2d at 1330-33.
53 Id. at 1335.
54 Id. at 1339.
55 Section 17 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to piescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not
such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965).
56 468 F.2d at 1339.
57 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
58 Id. at 524.
59 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
60 Id. at 987.
61 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
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test. The Vencap court held that: "[J]urisdiction is limited to the perpe-
tration of fraudulent acts themselves and does not extend to mere prepar-
atory activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts when the bulk of
the activity was performed in foreign countries."6 2
Sensitive to the interpretations of the conduct test which had
evolved, the district court in Tamari articulated the focus of the inquiry
involved in the conduct test as not "the residence or citizenship of the
parties and the foreign or domestic nature of the securities involved,"6 3
but instead, "the relative importance of activities within the U.S. to the
success of the alleged scheme to defraud."'  Structuring its inquiry to
determine initially whether Bache Lebanon's conduct constituted con-
duct within the United States and secondly to examine the "relative im-
portance" of any domestic conduct found to have been committed in
furtherance of defendant's alleged fraudulent scheme, the district court
concluded that conduct within the United States had taken place65 and
that the conduct was "substantial"66 or "significant" 67 when viewed "in
relation to its importance to the success of the alleged scheme to
defraud."68
In support of its conclusion with respect to the conduct test, the
district court found that the transmission by Bache Lebanon of the
Tamaris' orders from Beirut to Chicago constituted conduct within the
United States.6 9 The conclusion that the domestic conduct was both sub-
stantial and significant was buttressed by the finding that "Bache Leba-
non's writing of the Tamaris' orders to Chicago and the execution of
those orders on the Chicago exchanges were the final steps in the alleged
scheme."70 The execution of plaintiffs' orders in this country proved of
particular importance to the district court, as evidenced by its characteri-
zation of the execution as "a necessary and foreseeable step in a scheme
to defraud and thus substantial conduct within the U.S."'" Despite the
62 Id. at 1018.
63 547 F. Supp. at 313.
64 Id. at 313-14.




69 The district court premised this conclusion on the findings of several other courts that "mak-
ing phone calls or sending mail to the United States should be deemed conduct within the United
States for jurisdictional purposes in transnational cases." Id. See, e.g., Continental Grain (Austra-
lia) Pty., Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 n.18 (8th Cir. 1979) ("Both the place of
sending and the place of receipt constitute locations in which conduct takes place when the mails or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce are used to transmit communications.")





limitations placed on Leasco by its progeny, the district court in Tamari
found material conduct in furtherance of Bache Lebanon's alleged fraud-
ulent scheme had occurred in this country and thus the conduct test was
deemed satisfied by virtue of defendant's domestic activities.
2. The Effects Test
Like the conduct test, the effects test was also first fashioned by the
Second Circuit in a case dealing with an alleged violation of Section 10b
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, but in the context of a different
factual situation with an entirely different focus. The effects test grew
out of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,72 a case in which an American share-
holder in a Canadian corporation brought a derivative suit alleging fraud
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 where the challenged transac-
tion took place in Canada but involved Canadian stock registered on the
American Stock Exchange.73 Once again, the Second Circuit found itself
reversing a district court which had granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendant on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction. The Second Cir-
cuit in Schoenbaum held instead that the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 could be applied extraterritorially, "in order to protect domestic
investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges
and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of im-
proper foreign transactions in American securities."'
The foundation for the effects test is section eighteen of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States.75 While
the use of the effects test was intended to protect United States investors
from the adverse effects of fraudulent schemes concocted abroad and exe-
cuted on domestic exchanges, the question arose as to what type of show-
ing of an adverse effect on United States investors or domestic markets
would be necessary to satisfy the effects test. As was the case in Leasco, a
period of judicial retrenchment followed Schoenbaum during which the
72 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (af-
firming previous decision as to jurisdiction), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
73 id. at 204-05.
74 Id at 206.
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965). Section 18 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that
occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort
under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of
the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of
justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:351(1985)
effects test was refined. The result of this scrutiny was an effects test
calculated to be triggered only by bona fide threats to the integrity of
United States markets.76 Hereafter, when the securities at issue in a par-
ticular case are not registered on American exchanges and no showing of
a particularized harm to domestic interests is made, any "general" ad-
verse effect claimed by a plaintiff will be found to be too hypothetical or
indirect.7 7
The district court in Tamari interpreted the primary inquiry in-
volved in the effects test to be whether foreign conduct occurring abroad
causes foreseeable and substantial harm to interests within the United
States or whether, as the court stated more succinctly, "there is a sub-
stantial impact on domestic investors or on the domestic market."78 Ap-
plying the effects test to the facts in Tamari, the district court concluded
that since the transactions at issue "directly involved domestic futures
exchanges"7 9 no particularized harm had to be proven by plaintiffs.8"
Harm could be presumed to have befallen domestic exchanges in the in-
stant case, the court found, because the fraud alleged by the Tamaris
directly implicated the integrity of an American marketplace. 81 Thus,
although all of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations made by Bache
Lebanon had taken place abroad and even though plaintiffs could
demonstrate no adverse effect to a domestic market as the direct result of
the executions of their orders in this country, the protection of the integ-
rity of domestic exchanges was found to be of such paramount impor-
tance that adverse effects were presumed to have occurred simply by
76 The efforts by the judiciary to constrict the limits of the effects test were prompted by a
concern that affidavits by economists or other experts might persuade courts to accept "general"
adverse effects of market manipulation as sufficient to satisfy the effects test. Therefore, the at-
tempted refashioning of the effects test sought to have courts require a more substantial causal link
between the fraudulent activity complained of and any adverse effects on domestic markets alleged.
See Bersch, 519 F.2d 974, in which plaintiffs claimed that jurisdiction existed under the effects test on
account of the adverse general effect the collapse of an international corporation would have on
United States stock exchanges even though the demised company's shares were not traded on United
States exchanges. The Second Circuit in Bersch rejected such "general" adverse impact stating:
[W]e do not doubt that the collapse of IOS after the offering had an unfortunate financial effect
in the United States. Nevertheless we conclude that the generalized effects described by Prof.
Mendelson would not be sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over a damage suit by a
foreigner under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.
Id. at 988 (emphasis added).
See also Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 n.1l (E.D. Pa. 1975) (study showing
general adverse impact on economy in case where securities were not traded on domestic exchanges
held to be insufficient under the effects test).
77 547 F. Supp. at 313.
78 Id. at 311.





virtue of potentially fraudulent trading on a United States futures
market.
Having decided that both the conduct and the effects tests had been
satisfied by the facts presented in Tamari, the district court held that
subject matter jurisdiction existed, and defendant's motion for summary
judgment was denied.
D. The Court of Appeals
On appeal,82 Bache Lebanon asserted that the district court had
failed to consider whether Congress had intended the CEA to apply to
alleged illegal acts committed abroad by foreign citizens and also that the
conclusions of the district court as to the satisfaction of the conduct and
effects tests were mistaken. 3
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Bache
Lebanon's initial assertion and undertook an examination of the legisla-
tive history of the CEA. While recognizing the paucity of evidence ger-
mane to the issue of the Act's extraterritorial application,84 the court was
able to discern that one of Congress' fundamental purposes in enacting
the CEA was "to ensure fair practice and honest dealings on commodity
exchanges, for the protection of the market itself as well as those who
could be injured by unreasonable fluctuations in commodity prices."85
The court found that specific congressional intent relevant to whether
nonresident aliens could be held subject to the CEA's provisions when
the conduct proscribed had been committed abroad was nowhere ex-
pressly evident in the Act's text.
The absence of specific legislative guidance on the matter of the
transnational scope of the CEA left to the court's consideration both the
overarching aims of the CEA's legislative scheme and the interpretation
put forward by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")
as amicus curiae. The position adopted by the CFTC stressed that con-
gressional reports on the CEA in 197486 and 198287 as well as the
82 730 F.2d 1103.
83 Id. at 1106.
84 Id. at 1106-07.
85 Id. at 1106 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 14 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5856).
86 See H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Known as the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act, supra notes 33, 34, the Act expressly established the CFTC to strengthen
the regulation of futures markets.
87 See S. REP. No. 97-384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The further amendment of the CEA by
the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982), specifically § 204, added
a new subsection (b) to § 4 of the CEA which provides:
The Commission [CFTC] may adopt rules and regulations proscribing fraud and requiring min-
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CFTC's own rules and regulations dealing with the increased foreign
participation on domestic commodity futures exchanges88 evinced an at-
titude on the part of Congress to allow the application of the CEA to
nonresident aliens employing United States markets.89 Conversely,
Bache Lebanon placed great reliance upon the CFTC's own decision to
exclude "foreign associated persons of domestic firms"" from the
CFTC's registration requirements9' and asserted that this decision indi-
cated a purposeful policy decision to limit the reach of the CEA and the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.92
Its examination of the CEA's legislative history having failed to
prove dispositive, the court admitted that no conclusive evidence existed
to indicate that Congress did or did not intend the CEA to apply to
foreign commodity dealers or brokers when their fraudulent activities oc-
curred outside of the United States.93 The court, therefore, settled upon
the conduct and the effects tests, borrowed by the district court in
Tamari from the analogous body of securities law, as the appropriate
analytical tools with which to fashion standards controlling the extrater-
ritorial application of the CEA.94
Given the Court of Appeals' reading of the CEA's raison d'etre, "to
ensure the integrity of the domestic commodity markets,"95 it followed
logically that the Court of Appeals should affirm the district court's ap-
imum financial standards, the disclosure of risk, the filing of reports, the keeping of books and
records, the safeguarding of customers' funds and the registration with the Commission by any
person located in the United States, its territories or possessions, who engages in the offer or sale
of any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery that is made or to be made on or
subject to the rules of a board of trade, exchange or market located outside the United States, its
territories or possessions....
88 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 17.00, 21.02 (1983) (requiring foreign brokers and traders to comply
with CFTC reporting procedures and "special calls" for information regarding their market posi-
tions); 17 C.F.R. § 30.02 (1983) (prohibiting fraud in the domestic offer and sale of foreign futures
contracts).
89 730 F.2d at 1107.
90 Id.
91 17 C.F.R. § 3.12 (1983) (rescinding registration requirements for foreign associated persons of
domestic firms).
92 730 F.2d at 1107. However, no doubt in response to the issues raised by Bache Lebanon in
Tamari, the CFTC has published an "Advance Notice of CFTC Rulemaking on Foreign Futures" to
determine whether rules in addition to Rule 30.02 (prohibiting fraud in the domestic offer or sale of
foreign futures contracts) are needed. See 16 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 1272 (1984). Reasons given
by the CFTC for considering additional rules and regulations include:
[the] growing volume of foreign futures contracts; a projected increase in the number of foreign
futures contracts that closely parallel contracts offered in the United States or that may be of
particular interest to U.S. citizens [and] the development of proposed links between foreign and
U.S. exchanges....
Id.
93 730 F.2d at 1103.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1108.
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plication of the conduct and effects tests to the facts in Tamari. The
Court of Appeals held that only by extending the reach of the anti-fraud
provisions of the CEA to foreign traders who choose to transact business
on domestic exchanges could the fullest protection of domestic markets
be achieved.96
Bache Lebanon filed a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court on May 21, 198497 and on October 2, 198498 the Court
denied the petition.
IV. PAROCHIALISM OR PRUDENT REGULATORY POLICY
A. The Extent of Internationalization
As if the evolution of a transnational trading link were not enough
evidence of the increasing internationalization of world financial mar-
kets, it is a fact that while United States private investment in foreign
securities totalled $19.6 billion in 1971,11 by 1981 the same figure
eclipsed $62 billion.' Not surprisingly, foreign investment in United
States securities other than Treasury securities also exploded during the
decade of the seventies growing from $25.6 billion in 1971101 to $74 bil-
lion in 1981.102 Preliminary figures indicate that, as of 1983, United
States private investment in foreign securities reached $84.8 billion 10 3
while foreign investments in non-United States Treasury Securities ex-
ceeded $114.6 billion'4----inreases over the 1982 totals of roughly twelve
percent and twenty-two percent respectively. Securities and Exchange
Commissioner Barbara Thomas has offered the following explanation of
what she terms the "meteoric rise" in international financial transactions:
As global commerce has expanded, multinational corporations have
flourished, and technology has advanced, transnational securities transac-
tions have increased dramatically. In this connection, it is now common-
place for issuers to cross their national borders to raise capital in foreign
96 The court of appeals reasoned that: "Congress would have wished domestic markets and
domestic investors to be protected from improper foreign transactions." Id. The court concluded by
speculating as to what acceptance of the position espoused by Bache Lebanon would eventually
entail; "[w]ere we to construe the CEA as inapplicable to the foreign agents of commodity exchange
members when they facilitate trading on domestic exchanges, the domestic commodity futures mar-
ket would not be protected from the negative effects of fraudulent transactions or originating
abroad." Id.
97 730 F.2d 1103, petition for cerL filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 2575 (U.S. May 21, 1984) (No. 83-1904).
98 730 F.2d 1103, cerL denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3240, (U.S. Oct. 2, 1984) (No. 83-1904).
99 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 53 SuRv. CURRENT Bus. 21 (Aug. 1973).
100 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 61 SURV. CURRENT Bus. 56 (Aug. 1981).
101 See supra note 96.
102 See supra note 97.
103 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 64 SuRv. CURRENT Bus. 75 (June 1984).
104 Id.
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markets, and consequently, the commercial interface between corporations
and foreign parties through securities transactions has become a frequent
occurrence. In addition, sophisticated electronics and data processing sys-
tems have enabled investors to purchase and sell securities, and transfer
money, virtually instantaneously in any part of the world. Thus, no longer
encumbered by geographical limitations, investors have increasingly sent
their money abroad to invest in foreign securities, seeking higher profits and
less risk through diversified investment portfolios.105
It is in response to the internationalization of securities and futures
markets that the extraterritorial application of United States regulatory
statutes has become a primary concern of government regulators and the
securities industries of both this country as well as those countries whose
foreign capital and capital markets are most closely tied to domestic in-
vestment instruments and markets.I°6 The advent of transnational trad-
ing links1"7 provides a new framework within which to analyze the
difficulties, potential conflicts and policy arguments which have accom-
panied attempts to extend the application of United States law to trans-
actions originating abroad and executed on United States securities or
futures markets. Given the truly international composition of today's
market participants 10 8 and the seemingly unending variety of sophisti-
cated schemes devised to capitalize upon the unsuspecting investor or the
loosely-regulated marketplace,1 0 9 the extension of United States laws to
police the execution of foreign transactions on domestic markets should
be viewed as less objectionable than has heretofore been the case.110
105 Thomas, Extraterritoriality in an Era of Internationalization of the Securities Market: The
Need to Revisit Domestic Policies, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 453 (1983).
106 See, e.g., Thomas, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155 (1982). Thomas illustrates the remarkable interconnectedness of world
securities markets and considers how various United States regulatory policies may have a positive
or adverse impact on foreign activity in United States markets. For a foreign perspective of the
impact of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction in securities and antitrust matters, see David
Lord Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A Case for Concern Amongst
Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1979).
107 See supra note 10.
108 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 106, and the statistical breakdown of United States investment
abroad and foreign investment in the United States cited supra notes 96-101. See also Proposed
Duties of Futures Comms& Merchants Towards Accounts of Foreign Brokers and Traders, [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) § 21,028 (CFTC May 14, 1980); Interview with CFTC
Chairman Susan Phillips in 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 169 (Jan. 27, 1984); CFTC Rulemaking
on Foreign Futures, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1272 (July 27, 1984).
109 See references made to enforcement matters in: SEC DOCKET; SEC NEWS DIGEST; and U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT.
110 See, eg., Thomas, supra note 105; David Lord Hacking, supra note 106; Note, American
Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976); Sandberg, The Extra-
territorial Reach ofAmerican Economic Regulation: The Case ofSecurities Law, 17 HARV. INT'L




1. Arguments Against Liberal Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The securities and futures industries have advanced a number of ar-
guments opposing liberal extraterritorial application of domestic laws to
suits alleging fraud in transactions emanating from abroad. Initially, in-
dustry representatives claim that broadened United States jurisdiction
would further overload crowded federal court calendars and leave the
"precious resources" of United States courts and enforcement agencies
stretched beyond the breaking point.111 Another charge leveled at at-
tempts to expand United States extraterritorial jurisdiction concerns the
likelihood that the exercise of such jurisdiction will chill the trading ac-
tivity of foreign market participants who might fear that their foreign
customer-broker relationships will be governed by unfamiliar and unusu-
ally restrictive United States laws.112 And finally, there is the complaint
that, under the present tests for determining the existence of United
States jurisdiction, no consistent standards have yet been fashioned to
adequately characterize and put market participants on notice as to ex-
actly what degrees of "conduct" and what quantum of "effect" are suffi-
cient to trigger the exercise of extraterritorial application of United
States law. 113
Even the CFTC and the SEC, which have generally supported the
slow but steady expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction114 in further-
ance of their mandates to protect the interests of United States investors
and the integrity of United States markets, have acknowledged the possi-
bility of a conflict between United States laws and the laws of other na-
tions from which extraterritorial claims may originate.115 The potential
111 This reasoning was put forward by Bache Lebanon in its petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court and is taken directly from the opinion of the Second Circuit in Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985, cert denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). See also Fidenas AG
v. Compagnie Internationale, 606 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
112 See Amicus Brief in Support Of Petition For Writ of Certiorari filed by the Futures Industry
Association, Inc. and ten United States futures exchanges in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon), at
ix.
113 See, e-g., Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Laws: The Need for Reas-
sessment, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 529 (1980); Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust
and Securities Laws, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 575 (1979); Thomas, supra note 105.
114 For example, the CFrC filed an amicus brief with the Seventh Circuit urging affirmance of
the result reached in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) in the district court. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 86-87. Both the CFTC and the SEC submitted amicus briefs urging the result reached
by the Second Circuit in Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983) (foreign
initiated trading activities on United States commodities markets are significant acts and are suffi-
cient to establish subject matter jurisdiction in United States courts).
115 See, eg., Report of the Division of Trading and Markets and the Division of Economic Analy-
sis of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on the Proposed Mutual Offset System between
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:351(1985)
for continued extension of United States jurisdiction over allegations of
foreign securities and commodities fraud culminating in execution on a
United States exchange could, the agencies maintain, interfere with the
regulatory practices and governmental policies of foreign nations which
demonstrate an interest in prosecuting for themselves offenses allegedly
perpetrated within their national borders.116
2. Arguments Favoring Liberal Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
As has already been stressed, however, the inherent nature of a in-
ternational trading link-its active courtship of the virtual dependence
upon an international clientele-affords a timely opportunity to reevalu-
ate many of the traditional criticisms and concerns surrounding the ex-
traterritorial application of United States securities and commodities
laws. For example, the argument that the continued transnational appli-
cation of United States securities and commodities laws to allegations of
fraud occurring abroad will result in an all but unbearable and legisla-
tively-unintended burden being placed upon United States courts and en-
forcement agencies is largely undercut by the exacting administrative
scrutiny and governmental regulation without which a trading link could
never have commenced operation. It cannot be seriously asserted that
the CFTC and the congressional committees charged with its over-
sight117 did not foresee that a trading link between a domestic and a for-
eign futures exchange would result in the creation of a single entity-for
purposes of mutual offset-over which both the United States and Singa-
pore could be called upon to exercise jurisdiction.
Increased governmental involvement in the regulation and operation
of such ventures as the CME-SIMEX trading link as well as a clearly
discernible pattern on the part of United States courts to apply extraterri-
torial jurisdiction to claims arising abroad,'18 manifest a common con-
cern for the stringent policing of United States markets and the vigilant
protection of market participants.'19 No branch of government is more
keenly aware than the judiciary of the congestion which plagues its dock-
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange 120-24
(Aug. 28, 1984).
116 Id.
117 As a result of the historical association between agriculture and commodities trading, congres-
sional oversight of the regulation of domestic commodity markets has been vested in the House
Agriculture Committee and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.
118 See supra notes 50-81 and accompanying text.
119 The source of the judiciary's concern for the protection of market participants as well as the
integrity of the markets themselves is found in: S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-24
(1974); S. REP. No. 97-384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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ets; nevertheless, the judicial circuits in which extraterritorial securities
and commodities claims have been brought12 have felt compelled to ap-
ply United States laws in order to comply with the legislative schemes
codified in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sec-
tion 4(b) of the Commodities Exchange Act. Congress, for its part, while
possessing the ability to adopt legislation to curtail what critics charge is
an unwarranted extension of United States jurisdiction, has, without
comment, permitted the continued evolution of case law supporting the
extraterritorial application of United States laws to foreign claims involv-
ing some conduct within or some effect upon investors or markets in this
country. 12 1 Thus, the arguments that the judiciary is being overrun by a
"steady flow into the federal courts of disappointed foreign speculators in
commodities futures and financial futures" 122 and that such an insuffera-
ble burden was never the intent of Congress in passing securities and
commodities legislation are belied both by history and legislative inaction
suggesting the contrary.
The charge that extraterritorial application of United States laws to
United States market activity initiated abroad will result in a chilling of
such activity with a concomitant decrease in both overall market liquid-
ity and total foreign investment in United States markets is similarly un-
tenable in a world where national economies have grown increasingly
intertwined. Once again, the development of the CME-SIMEX trading
link provides an interesting case in point. Presumably, those choosing to
execute transactions utilizing the trading link will have based their choice
of market upon the distinct advantages an international trading link has
to offer.123 Irrespective of ample judicial precedent, 2 ' logic alone should
put all market participants on notice that jurisdiction over claims of
fraud precedent to CME-SIMEX execution could be exercised in either
the United States or Singapore in furtherance of a legitimate national
interest in policing the integrity and ensuring the viability of the trading
120 The issue of extraterritorial application of United States securities and commodities statutes
has been litigated in the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.
121 Although Congress clearly possesses the authority to clarify its legislative intent with respect
to the extraterritorial application of United States securities and commodities statutes, no legislation
has been forthcoming to modify the case law which has overwhelmingly favored extension of appli-
cable United States laws.
122 See Bache Lebanon's Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit (May 21, 1984).
123 See supra text accompanying notes 15-33.
124 See Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon), 547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. IlM. 1982) (summarizing the
growing body of case law).
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link.125 Moreover, notions of equity argue for the proposition that one
seeking to benefit by use of the trading link (in effect, the markets of
another country) must bear any burden which might result from the ap-
plication of United States or Singapore law instead of the laws of the
transgressor's own nation.126 The application of United States law to a
claim with origins abroad cannot be viewed fairly as a penalty or as a
protectionist barrier to international commerce, but rather should be un-
derstood as a risk willingly assumed by those seeking the advantages of
the markets of a foreign nation, a nation with a vital interest in the lawful
conduct of its markets' participants.
Finally, the criticisms leveled by members of the securities and fu-
tures industry at the standards currently employed by United States
courts to determine the existence of their jurisdiction seem increasingly
unpersuasive in the context of such bold new international ventures as
transnational trading links. Whereas in Tamari,'27 the district court
struggled to evaluate and characterize the nature of the conduct per-
formed in the United States by Bache & Co. as agent for Bache Leba-
non, 128 parties wishing to execute some part of their transactions abroad
must be made to appreciate the necessity of abiding by the laws of the
foreign forum whose commercial benefits they seek to enjoy. Rather
than attempting to characterize a species of conduct or effect as "prepar-
atory," "significant," or "important,"' 129 an inherently subjective task,130
the interest that the United States has in assuring the integrity of its mar-
ketplaces for the sake of both domestic as well as international economic
stability should now be sufficient to give jurisdiction to a United States
court when a complainant so chooses and the facts so warrant. Simi-
larly, the virtual impossibility of demonstrating a nexus between a de-
fendant's fraudulent conduct and discernible effect upon a United States
125 See Sections 17 and 18, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 17-18 (1965).
126 Not only do notions of equity argue that one seeking the benefits of transacting commerce in a
foreign forum should be subject to the laws of that forum but an analogy to the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk also seems appropriate. In effect, one who knowingly undertakes to transact business in
or on the markets of another nation may be assumed to have implicitly consented to bear any burden
or absorb any injury resulting from the application of the laws of the foreign forum.
127 547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Il1. 1982).
128 See supra text accompanying notes 49-71.
129 Id.
130 Much of the criticism leveled at the conduct test has centered around the extent to which
characterizing degrees of alleged fraudulent conduct is really a metaphysical exercise, as concerned
with the semantics as with principles of law. See, e.g., Note, supra note 113, at 549; Thomas, supra
note 105, at 459 (the conduct and effects tests are, "too simple and mechanistic to adequately express




marketplace13 1 would disappear as a prerequisite to establishing jurisdic-
tion where use of the trading link, in and of itself, would constitute an
acknowledgement of probable United States jurisdiction.
C. A Proposed Rationale for United States
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Of considerably greater importance than the arguments voiced by
private commercial interests against a policy of liberal United States ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction in securities fraud cases is a growing concern
among our allies and trading partners that:
agencies of the United States government, over an everwidening field of
international commerce, are persistently making more and more attempts
to impose domestic laws on persons and corporations who are not U.S.
nationals and who are acting outside the territory of the United States.
1 3 2
There can be little doubt that some in the international community see
the extraterritorial application of United States securities and commodi-
ties laws as an attempt, in Chief Justice Burger's words: "[to] have trade
and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on
our terms, governed by our laws and resolved in our courts. ' 133 The
application of domestic laws to securities transactions either executed on
or having some effect upon United States markets, however, should not
be confused with the extraterritorial application of United States anti-
trust and business disclosure statutes which possess a far greater likeli-
hood of interfering with the economic policies and regulatory practices of
our partners in commerce.134
Crucial at the outset is a realization that both Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 4(b) of the CEA require
some dealing in interstate commerce before a violation of either Act's
anti-fraud provision can occur. 135 Thus, before any attempt to exercise
United States jurisdiction in an action brought under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 4(b) of the CEA, some con-
duct within the United States must have taken place. As the constitu-
tionally designated regulator of interstate commerce, 136 the federal
government and its statutes are, a fortiori, 137 properly employed to police
131 For a discussion of the effects test, see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
132 See David Lord Hacking, supra note 106, at 2.
133 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
134 See Grossfeld & Rogers, A Shared Values Approach to Jurisdictional Conflicts in International
Economic Law, 32 IN'L & COMP. L.Q. 931 (1983); Toms, The French Response to the Extraterrito-
rial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L L.J. 585 (1981).
135 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1976).
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
137 U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
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the use of the means of interstate commerce whether by United States or
foreign citizens. 138 Rather than attempting to categorize different de-
grees of conduct within this country in order to satisfy the "conduct test"
fashioned in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation v. Max-
well, 13 9 Congress' constitutional mandate to regulate and to police the
use of interstate commerce justifies what has been termed a "minimal
conduct approach"'" to extraterritorial jurisdiction over transnational
securities and commodities fraud cases. The minimal conduct approach,
simply put, would allow for the application of United States law to an
allegation of transnational securities fraud where any use of interstate
commerce was employed and not merely where foreign sponsored activ-
ity or conduct in the United States was "significant" or "important."''
In addition to a conduct-based rationale for the extraterritorial ap-
plication of United States securities and commodities laws, several policy
reasons argue for the proposition, that, in an era of international financial
markets, the extension of United States jurisdiction to transnational
claims of fraud protects not only United States investors but also foreign
participants in United States markets. 42 Clearly, the primary purpose of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 4(b) of
the CEA is to protect domestic investors from becoming the objects of
schemes to defraud perpetrated either in this country or from abroad. 143
However, in IIT v. Vencap,'1 " the Second Circuit concluded: "We do not
think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base
for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even where
these are peddled only to foreigners."' 4 5 The Second Circuit's acknowl-
edgement of the interests of foreign market participants in Vencap force-
fully demonstrates the fallacy of claims by other nations that
extraterritorial application of United States securities laws is intrusive,
meddlesome, and overtly protectionist where fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions occur abroad and only market execution takes place in the United
States. The extraterritorial application of United States securities laws is
aimed equally at protecting the interests of domestic investors and at
foreclosing the use of United States markets to those who would employ
138 See supra note 125.
139 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
140 See Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Basis for Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: A
Minimal Conduct Approach, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 308 (1983).
141 See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
142 See, e.g., Note, supra note 140.
143 See supra note 119.
144 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
145 Id. at 1017.
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them in furtherance of schemes to defraud investors abroad.
146
Deterrence of fraudulent market activity and, concurrently, the af-
firmative encouragement of lawful market conduct is the goal of the anti-
fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the CEA. 147
To the extent that an international claim must, by definition, have an
impact upon the jurisdiction of another nation, the exercise of United
States jurisdiction will appear intrusive. Nonetheless, the aim of such a
judicial determination is by no means a desire to bring international com-
merce within the exclusive domain of United States tribunals. One need
look no farther than the protestations of the securities industry148 for
evidence that the threatened application of United States anti-fraud stat-
utes is a powerful deterrent to potential illicit conduct. 49 The Third
Circuit in SEC v. Kasser 5 addressed the importance of deterrence as a
rationale for extending the reach of United States securities laws to
claims arising from international transactions:
From a policy perspective, and it should be recognized that this case in
large measure calls for a policy decision, we believe that there are sound
rationales for asserting jurisdiction. First, to deny such jurisdiction may
embolden those who wish to defraud foreign securities purchasers or sellers
to use the United States as a base of operations. By sustaining the decision
of the district court as to the lack ofjurisdiction, we would, in effect create a
haven for such defrauders and manipulators. We are reluctant to conclude
that Congress intended to allow the United States to become a "Barbary
Coast," as it were, harboring international securities "pirates."' 5'1
As a final response to international criticism of United States securi-
ties regulatory policy, nations which insist that extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States securities laws will result in the creation of
formidable obstacles which will have an adverse impact upon efforts to
raise capital in the United States, 152 fail to consider that, instead of dis-
couraging investment abroad, the extraterritorial application of United
146 Id. See also Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1041 ('... Congress did not want the U.S. to be used as a
base for manufacturing fraudulent securities devices, irrespective of the nationality of the victim
147 See supra note 119.
148 See supra notes 110-33 and accompanying text.
149 The degree to which the securities industry has fought the extension of United States anti-
fraud statutes to extraterritorial transactions constitutes persuasive evidence that such statutes are a
necessary and efficacious way to police international securities transactions executed in this country.
150 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
151 Id. at 116.
152 For a thorough discussion of the effects of extraterritorial application of United States anti-
fraud statutes on foreign capital formation, see Bloomenthal, Extraterritorial Application of United
States Securities Laws-Recent Developments, 2 See. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman) 114
(1980).
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States laws may actually facilitate foreign capital formation. 15 3 Unlike
the exportation of United States antitrust policy,1 54 it remains to be
proven that application of United States securities laws pose a threat,
where their application is deemed warranted, to the economies of any
foreign nation. Moreover, insofar as foreign capital formation is often
largely dependent upon offerings in the United States, 15 5 United States
investors may well be more willing to invest in foreign securities with the
knowledge that there will be a lesser risk of fraud where foreign broker-
dealers are held accountable for their conduct under United State securi-
ties statutes. Thus, more likely than not, the strict enforcement and ap-
propriate extraterritorial application of United States securities laws will
encourage rather than impede the investment of United States capital in
fledgling as well as established foreign enterprises.
One need not be extremely well-versed in the intracacies of securities
law to realize how the exercise of United States jurisdiction over transna-
tional securities fraud cases might be taken as an affront by foreign na-
tions. Similarly, the perception of the securities industry that application
of United States statutes to fraudulent conduct occurring predominantly
outside the United States will discourage foreign participation in domes-
tic markets is an understandable, albeit groundless, concern. Neither the
complaints of our trading partners nor the cries of the financial commu-
nity, however, should be permitted to interfere with the strict regulation,
including extraterritorial United States jurisdiction, of securities transac-
tions when the integrity of United States markets or the protection of
United States investors are genuinely at stake.
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in securities and com-
modities fraud cases by the United States is aimed simply at protecting
United States financial marketplaces and those conducting business
there. The fact that United States markets are now formally linked with
the markets of other nations unavoidably extends the legitimate sphere of
United States regulatory policy, but, at the same time, the powerful de-
terrent force of United States law is brought to bear to discourage the
perpetration of fraud through the use, no matter how limited, of United
States securities and commodities markets and their affiliates.
V. CONCLUSION
While the complexity of investment instruments and investment
153 See Thomas, supra note 109 and sources cited therein. See also figures cited in the Commerce
Department's monthly Survey of Current Business, supra notes 99-104.
154 See supra note 134.
155 See supra note 152.
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strategies has increased considerably over the past few years, world finan-
cial markets have become truly international in membership. The desire
to manage more effectively the overnight trading risk involved in futures
trading has given birth to the concept of the intercontinental trading link
making possible the offset of market positions, and thus the limiting of
risk, during hours when markets would ordinarily be closed. An una-
voidable consequence of this increased internationalization of financial
markets, however, has been the problem of how and by whom such ven-
tures as international trading links will be regulated.
Case law involving United States securities and commodities stat-
utes has gone to great lengths to devise the proper tests and criteria in an
effort to limit extraterritorial application of United States jurisdiction to
those cases in which fraudulent conduct initiated abroad and exported to
this country, to any extent, poses a real danger to domestic interests.
Neither hairsplitting semantic distinctions between degrees of "conduct"
or "effect" or trading bloc rivalries aggravated as the result of the extra-
territorial application of United States jurisdiction should be allowed to
divert attention away from what is ultimately at stake-the strict regula-
tion and smooth functioning of international as well as internationally-
linked financial markets.
At present, United States courts will only apply domestic regulatory
statutes to cases in which some aspect of fraudulent conduct or some step
in furtherance of a scheme to defraud takes place in the United States.
However, for better or worse, many of the world's most important and
complex financial transactions occur in domestic securities markets or
are facilitated by the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
The extraterritorial application of United States jurisdiction to transna-
tional securities and commodities fraud cases, while concededly an in-
creasingly frequent phenomenon, is primarily a reflection of United
States prominence in the financial world, a prominence largely acquired
due to the integrity of United States financial markets. The United States
must continue to maintain the integrity of its financial markets, in part
through a judicious policy of appropriate extraterritorial application of
United States anti-fraud statutes for the sake of both domestic investors,
investors abroad, as well as for the good of the world economy.
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